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Background
The Challenger report  
• Following the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, the       
Rogers Commission reported:
– S&MA not included in technical issue discussions
– Inadequate S&MA staffing at MSFC – “Reductions in the safety        , 
reliability and quality assurance work force at Marshall and NASA 
Headquarters have seriously limited capability in those vital 
functions (safety program responsibility) to ensure proper 
i icommun cat ons”
– “A properly staffed, supported, and robust safety organization 
might well have avoided these faults (addressing faults within the 




The Columbia Report  
• Following the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the 
Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) 
reported:
– “Throughout its history, NASA has consistently struggled to 
achieve viable safety programs and adjust them to the constraints 
and vagaries of changing budgets”
– “The Board believes that the safety organization due to a lack of      ,      
capability and resources independent of the Shuttle Program, was 
not an effective voice in discussing technical issues or mission 
operations pertaining to STS-107.”
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Background 
The 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study 
• The 2006 NASA Exploration Safety Study (NESS) Team 
f d th t NASA “S f t d Mi i A ioun  a   a e y an  ss on ssurance s 
ineffective in carrying out its assigned responsibilities as 
given in the Governance document in many, but not all, 
NASA Centers ” They cited: .    
– Lack of leadership 
– Lack of clearly defined lines of authority for action 
– Lack of clearly defined levels of responsibility for SMA requirements         
– Lack of technical excellence of personnel in the safety disciplines
– Lack of personnel with domain knowledge
• All of the above have led to lack of peer level respect from             




The message from the past    
• Common themes of all three efforts:     
– Inadequate resources
– Lack of discipline expertise
– Lack of respect by engineering peers
– Lack of inclusion in technical decisions
– Lack of independence
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Creating the Environment
The Professional Development Roadmap   
• Overall Objective - Improve and maintain S&MA 
expertise and skills. 
• Supporting Objectives:
Develop a “Professional Development Roadmap” for each of the–          
three main S&MA engineering disciplines (Systems Safety, R&M, 
and Quality Engineering).  
• Provide structured guidance for S&MA engineers to use in         
their efforts to become experts in their field.
– Identify courses and knowledge that S&MA engineers 
need in order to develop their expertise      .
– Will base training on individuals current level of expertise.
• Provide structured guidance to engineers in the development of 
h i l IDP
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t e r annua  s..
Creating the Environment
S&MA Professional Development Flow
Select S&MA Specialty/ 
Discipline & Volunteer to 
participate
APPRENTICE







Complete training & OJT. 
Validate knowledge with 
mentor 
    









Engineer identifies and 
provides evidence of 
Roadmap elements already 
completed to Supervisor
Prepare IDP using Training 











rationale to S&MA 
Management Team
Complete training & OJT. 








S&MA Management Team 
selects discipline level based on 
documented evidence and 
Complete training & OJT. 
Validate knowledge with 
mentor
Prepare IDP using Training 




















The Professional Development Roadmap   
• S&MA Discipline Training Roadmaps were expanded      
beyond Systems Safety, Reliability & Maintainability, 
and Quality Engineering to include:
– Auditor 
– Software Assurance 
– Industrial Safety Specialist 
– Quality Assurance 
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Creating the Environment 
S&MA Re-organization 
• Objectives:
– Optimize S&MA organization to best facilitate Shuttle transition in 
2010 f ll t A d l t l ibiliti d, success u y suppor  res eve opmen a  respons es, an  
minimize the impacts of the gap between last shuttle flight and start of 
Ares V Project.
– Improve leveraging of critical skills and experience between Shuttle and 
Ares.
– Split technical and supervisory functions to facilitate technical 
penetration. 
– Create CSO (chief safety and mission assurance officer) stand-alone         
position for successfully implementation of S&MA Technical Authority.
– Minimize disruption to customers.
– Provide Early involvement of S&MA leadership team and frequent/open 
communications with S&MA team members and stakeholders. 
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Creating the Environment  - S&MA Re-organization
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Program and Safety Panel Support
Deputy Program Assurance 
Lvl. 2 Constellation CSO 
Lvl. 2/3 Shuttle CSO
NSC R&M Tech. Fellow QD01
Mission Systems Assurance and 
Technical Support Department
Vehicle Systems Department
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Creating the Environment 
S&MA Re-organization
Vehicle Systems Department
Dave Spacek – Dept. Manager
Chris Cianciola – Ares I Level 3 CSO
QD30
      
Sherry Jennings - Ares V Level 3 CSO
QD31 QD33
Upper Stage/ET Branch
David Cockrell – Branch Chief
Rich Gladwin - ET  CSO 
Joel Anderson – Ares US CSO
Solid Motors Branch
Paul Teehan - Branch Chief
David Ricks – RSRB CSO 
Randall Tucker Ares FS CSO
Li id E i B h L h S I t ti B h
QD32 QD34
  –   
qu  ng nes ranc
Ron Davenport - Branch Chief
Roz Patrick - SSME CSO 
Phil Boswell – Ares J-2X CSO
aunc  ys n egra on ranc
Toan Vu - Branch Chief
Dave Schaefer - Shuttle Intg. CSO




• Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officers (CSOs)
– Are equivalent to Element, Project and Program Chief Engineers. 
– CM&O TA funded.
– Mainly responsible for project technical down and in.
– Represent S&MA TA on assigned boards and panels.
– Responsible for technical quality of organizational products.
• Department Managers and Branch Chiefs    
– Are the supervisors for the Level III and Level IV CSOs. 
– Can act for their CSOs and implement TA in their CSOs absence.
– Are CM&O TA funded t y   .
– Responsible for the care, feeding and staffing of organization.
– Represent S&MA TA on assigned boards and panels. 



























Post Columbia S&MA Enablers   
• Agency
– Created S&MA Technical Authority
– Created NASA Safety Center
– Created Discipline Fellows ST for S&MA Disciplines (in work)
• MSFC 
– Elevated MSFC S&MA Office to a Directorate
– Elevated MSFC S&MA Deputy Director position to SES level
– Created senior level engineering SES rotational position (every 2 
years) in S&MA – Director for Program Assurance 
– Elevated Chief Safety and Mission Assurance Officer (CSO) 
positions to grade levels equivalent with MSFC Chief Engineers        

































The S&MA Paradigm shift
The System Design Requirements Change    
• NASA has committed to a major space exploration program, 
called Constellation, intended to send crew and cargo to the 
International Space Station (ISS), to the moon, and beyond.
• In the past, space vehicle designers focused on performance. 
• Lessons learned from the Space Shuttle and other launch vehicles 
show the need to optimize launch vehicles for other system 
parameters (reliability, safety, cost, availability, etc.) besides 
performance.
• The Constellation program has, therefore, put in place ambitious 
requirements for reliability, safety, and cost . 
• The new requirements have forced a paradigm shift on how to 
design and build new launch vehicles which resulted in the 
creation of an integrated Risk-based design environment (e.g. 
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Integrated analyses, disciplines, organizations, etc.) and the early 
involvement of S&MA  in the design process
The S&MA Paradigm shift
The S&MA Functional Roles Change
Assurance: Making certain that specified activities performed by others are performed in accordance 
i h ifi d i ( i d i S )w t  spec e  requ rements. Upper stage Eng ne an  F rst tage  
Examples of the activities include:
• Assess Hazard Analyses, FTAs, FMEA/CIL, PRA, etc.
• Approving Material Review Board (MRB) dispositions.
P f i t i ti dit d ill• er orm ng governmen  nspec ons, au s, an  surve ance.
• Independent assessments.
• Evaluating engineering and manufacturing changes, or proposed variances 
(adaptations, deviations, and waivers), for impacts to safety, reliability, and/or quality
• Evaluating the disposition of problems, including corrective actions (e.g., PRACA 
problem reports)
In-Line S&MA activities performed in direct support of the program/project to ensure that the 
program/project will achieve its objectives (Upper Stage and Vehicle Integration)
Examples of the activities include:
• Establish and implement S&MA programmatic and technical requirements.
• Perform Probabilistic Risk Assessments, Reliability Analysis, Integrated System 
Failure Analysis,  Hazard Analyses, Fault Tree Analyses, FMEA/CIL, etc.
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• Develop S&MA plans and methodologies.
• Establish and implement Industrial Safety.
Creating the Environment
The  S&MA, project, and Engineering Integrated 
Operating Environment  Change
Crew Safety &
Reliability
Crew Safety & Reliability 
Integration 
S&MA Integration with 
Project and Engineering  





















The  S&MA, project, and Engineering Integrated
Operating Environment  Change
S&MA leading the Integrated FMEA Working Group
Integrated FMEA feeds other key analyses used to drive the safety 
and reliability of the Ares I design
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Creating the Environment
The  S&MA, project, and Engineering Integrated 
Operating Environment Change   
• S&MA leading the Ares I System Safety Working 
Group: 
– Integrated Hazards
• Identify hazard causes and controls that cross system and element          
boundaries and assure mitigation for the hazard causes
• Ensure proper communication between Engineering (Design input 
for Hazard Controls) and S&MA – verify safety’s understanding of 
vehicle design and ensure engineering design implementation of 
potential hazards
• L2 – address hazards associated with Ares/Orion integrated stack 
Æ i t f ith L l 2 SE&In er ace w  eve   
• L3 – address hazards associated with Ares vehicle Æ Ares VI 
S&MA
Assumed lead role in development of Fault Trees for Controls HR and–             
Flight Termination System (FTS) HR to meet Phase 1 requirements 
(PDR)
Creating the Environment
The  S&MA, project, and Engineering Integrated 
i i hOperat ng Env ronment C ange
S&MA leading the Ares I Ascent Risk Working Group
Conceptual Design Phase Design & Development Phase Operational Phase
 Support System 
Design
 Support Subsystem & 
Component Design
 Support System 
Risk Assessments
• Integrated system 
i i
• Integrated  with IPT’s
• Support launch issuesr sk model ng and 
analysis
• System physics-based    





mo e ng an  ana ys s
• Blast modeling for 
abort risk assessment




The impact – Early involvement in the design process
Ares I Design impact (Examples)
• Example of S&MA impact on the Ares I Design
– Influenced the choice of the solution to the Thrust Oscillation issue.  Jointly 
working with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability, 
quality and safety impacts of the various design solutions to the thrust oscillation             
issue. A lesson learned in “integrated failure analysis” from the Shuttle ET foam 
problem that contributed to the Columbia accident (Vehicle Integration)
– Influenced the design solution to the First Stage-Upper Stage separation issue.  
Jointly working with engineering and Ares I project, S&MA assessed the reliability            
and safety impacts of the various design solutions to the First Stage-Upper Stage 
separation issue. Another lesson learned in “integrated failure analysis” from the 
Shuttle ET foam problem that contributed to the Columbia accident (Vehicle 
Integration)
– Recommended pressurization line be moved out of cable tray to reduce risk to LSC 
and avionics  (upper Stage)
– Optimized valve design for reliability and safety for LH2 and LO2 pressurization.
– Identified issue with use of KC fittings in safety-critical applications and approach 
to qualifying fittings as providing two seals (upper Stage)
– Influenced the change of Linear Shape Charge (LSC) initiation timers from 
percussion to Flexible Confined Detonation Cord initiated timers (Flight 
Termination System)
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The impact – Early involvement in the design process
Ares I Products (Examples)
♦S&MA In-House Developed Products
• Vehicle Integration - Crew Safety and Reliability Products 
− Ares I Failure Mode Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL)
A S S f A l i ( d A l i )− res I ystem a ety na ys s Report Hazar  na ys s
− Ares I Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) Report
− Ares I Ascent Risk Analysis (ARA) Report
− Integrated Aborts Plan
− Aborts Risk Assessment 
• Upper Stage S&MA Products
− Safety, Reliability and Quality Plan
− Failure Mode Effects Analysis
− System Safety Analysis Report (including Fault Tree)
PRA Report−  
− Reliability and Maintainability Analysis Report (Reference)
− Limited Life Items List 
♦Peer Review Products
U S E i d Fi S P R i• pper tage ng ne an  rst tage eer ev ew
− Quality Assurance Plan
− System Safety Plan; Safety, Heath & Environment Plan
− Reliability & Maintainability Program Plan
− Failure Modes & Effects Analysis, Critical Items List, Limited Life Items
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− Reliability Allocations, Predictions & Analysis Report
− Hazard Fault Tree Analysis Report
The impact – Early involvement in the design process
Are I Design Reviews (Example)
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The S&MA Path to the Future
• We will continue building on our strength and the         
success path we started on Ares I.
• Ares I lessons learned are being used in  supporting 
Ares V starting early in the conceptual design.
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